[Part 1] The 2026 Midterm Election Primaries and the Movement to Nullify the South Korean Local Elections

 

[Part 1] The 2026 Midterm Election Primaries and the Movement to Nullify the South Korean Local Elections



With only a few months left until the U.S. Midterm Elections this November, the political climate is heating up. In the United States, candidates will actively host town hall meetings with voters to widely publicize their pledges and campaign. Prior to the elections, many candidates will exert every effort to convey their vision by interacting with voters through town hall meetings as well as at any other locations. This is quintessential Greek-style democracy. The core essence of Greek democracy lies in the ability of candidates to express their visions anytime and anywhere without restrictions.

Although South Korea's electoral system is said to be modeled directly after American democracy, hundreds of thousands of people have gathered at Olympic Park, protesting day and night to demand a re-election, even though the June 3rd Local Elections have already concluded. Over 50% of the public is now demanding a re-election. This figure is on a steady rise. In South Korea, voter turnout for local elections generally hovers around 60%. The participation rate is not as high as that of presidential elections. Consequently, local elections tend to receive lower public attention, and in South Korea, these local elections carry a political weight equivalent to the U.S. Midterm Elections.

Why is it that candidates in South Korea cannot hold town hall meetings without constraints on time and location, unlike in the United States?




Having adopted the American democratic system, newly independent South Korea in 1948 legally guaranteed town hall meetings just like in the United States. Meanwhile, in 1925 during Japan's colonial rule over Korea, Japan devised a shrewd maneuver to absolutely safeguard the Emperor system and forcibly suppress those who clamored for a republic. They enacted the Peace Preservation Act (Note: Historically referred to as the Public Security Preservation Act) even before establishing the electoral law. Under this law, anyone who advocated for a republic was systematically arrested and imprisoned.

In 1948, South Korea established its nation by escaping colonial rule with the assistance of the United States. Although the country adopted an American-style democratic system for its framework, it also borrowed and began utilizing the restrictive enforcement methods from the electoral law established by Imperial Japan in 1925. One of those specific legal provisions is as follows:

“Article 42 (Restrictions on Election Campaigning) of the National Assembly Members Election Act of 1948 Candidates or election campaign workers shall not make door-to-door (house-by-house) visits for the purpose of election campaigning.”

Independent South Korea, without properly understanding the intent behind this malicious law—which Imperial Japan had enacted out of fear that people moving around would negate the Emperor system—adopted and utilized it exactly as it was. This practice has continued and remains in use to this day.

Once door-to-door visits and town hall meetings by candidates were permitted, South Korea, which was a developing nation at the time, suffered from severe electoral bribery and corruption. Out of fear of public political assemblies, the Syngman Rhee administration newly established Article 61 ("Prohibition of Assemblies Regardless of Title or Pretext") under Act No. 477 in 1958. Furthermore, under Article 60 (Restrictions on Holding Rallies), election campaigns through speech rallies were restricted strictly to public rallies and individual rallies specified by this law. This provision fundamentally blocked American-style town hall meetings by law.




Following the resignation of the Syngman Rhee administration due to the March 15th Rigged Election in 1960, the Park Jung-hee administration took office in 1963. To ensure that the tragedy of the March 15th Rigged Election—which was actively driven by the Ministry of Home Affairs (the government) in 1960—would never be repeated, South Korea completely insulated the National Election Commission (NEC) through constitutional protections, preventing any powerful figure, including the President or National Assembly members, from interfering with election management.

The powerful independence created to cut off the 'government-controlled elections (election interference)' of past regimes has paradoxically become a double-edged sword of bloated, monopolized power today. When administrative failures (such as the Jamsil incident) erupt, it invites the criticism that "not even National Assembly members can control the NEC as they please." This represents a painful underlying chapter in the history of South Korean democracy.

The National Election Commission: A Power Organ Immune to Oversight



National Assembly members are constitutional organs possessing legislative power, and the National Election Commission is likewise an independent constitutional organ dedicated exclusively to election management; thus, both stand as peer state institutions. Nevertheless, the reason public and political circles claim that "the NEC acts as if it stands above the heads of National Assembly members" is due to the following core legal provisions that guarantee the NEC's powerful 'independence' and 'rulemaking authority.'

1. Provisions Granting Extra-Legal Independence to the NEC

These provisions completely block political circles (National Assembly members) or the administration (the executive branch) from meddling in or exerting pressure on election affairs.

  • Article 114, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea: "The National Election Commission shall be established for the purpose of fair management of elections and national referendums, and dealing with administrative affairs concerning political parties."

  • Article 11 of the National Election Commission Act (Independence of Duties): "Each level of the National Election Commission shall not be subordinate to administrative agencies in performing its duties."

Because of these provisions, even if National Assembly members or political party leaders fiercely protest and demand a halt to vote counting regarding administrative failures like the Jamsil incident, the NEC can assert, "We are an independent constitutional organ and have no obligation to follow instructions or demands from political circles." They can then push forward with their autonomous decisions (such as forcing through the ballot count or declaring winners). In this process, voters and politicians alike are left with a profound sense of helplessness and an impression of arbitrary dogmatism.

2. 'Rulemaking Authority' Bearing Equal Efficacy to Laws Enacted by the National Assembly

The area where National Assembly members experience the greatest legal friction is the NEC's authority to enact its own rules.

  • Article 115 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea: "The Central Election Commission may, within the limits of laws and decrees, establish regulations relating to the management of elections, national referendums, or administrative affairs concerning political parties..."

Even if the National Assembly passes a broad framework for election laws, the specific operational rules—such as how to run polling stations, how many ballots to print, and how to handle contingencies when administrative failures occur—are directly instituted through the Regulations of the Central Election Commission. Even for a National Assembly member, if the NEC executes administration using its internal rules as a shield, there is no immediate legal mechanism available to restrain or replace them.

3. Enforcement Authority Binding the Hands and Feet of Legislators During Election Periods

The NEC holds authority akin to powerful judicial police to guide, supervise, and investigate candidates (including sitting National Assembly members).

  • Article 14-2 of the National Election Commission Act (Investigation of Violations, etc.): NEC officials have the authority to enter the offices of candidates (including National Assembly members) to question individuals or demand the submission of evidence when a violation of election law is suspected.

Once the election period begins, National Assembly members and political parties find themselves in a position where they must mind the NEC and pay close attention to its enforcement guidelines, causing the NEC's power to be felt much more heavily on the ground than that of the legislative branch itself.

In Summary

The phrase "the NEC stands above the National Assembly" does not imply a higher rank in the official hierarchy, but rather means that the NEC possesses a bloated authority capable of flatly rejecting the demands of political parties or legislators, using its constitutionally guaranteed 'independence' (Article 11 of the NEC Act) and 'rulemaking authority' (Article 115 of the Constitution) as weapons.

As South Korea approaches nearly 80 years of independence, the National Election Commission—which was originally created with good intentions as a result of the country's stained history of corrupt elections—has anomalously transformed into an adversary of South Korean democracy, currently clashing with the resistance of the vast majority of the public. President Yoon's motivation for declaring emergency martial law was also driven, in part, by the need to audit this National Election Commission, which has become an unchecked power organ.

In the upcoming Part 2, I will explain the underlying causes and reasons why citizens are crying out for a re-election and fighting at Jamsil Olympic Park. I kindly ask for your continued readership, and request your abundant support for South Korean democracy and a fair re-election.

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